

## 霧に包まれた「美しい国」(Asia's Mystery Man)

(2006.9.20 Newsweek Japan by クリスチャン・カレル、柏木明子、李炳宗)

安倍晋三でほぼ確定のポスト小泉レース。9月26日には安倍首相が誕生する見込みだが、憲法改正や対北朝鮮強硬論以外、安倍政治のイメージはぼやけたまま。人気者のタカ派政治家は日本をどこへ導くのか。

8月15日の終戦記念日に小泉純一郎首相が靖国神社を参拝したとき、そのニュースは海外でも大きく伝えられ、中国と韓国の両政府は強い抗議の意を示した。しかし8月初めに、安倍晋三官房長官が4月に靖国神社を参拝していたと報じられても、日本国外で気にとめた人はあまりいなかった。

安倍が意識的にマスコミのカメラを避けて参拝したにせよ、この反応の違いは不釣り合いにみえる。なにしろ、小泉がまもなく政治の表舞台を去り、過去の人になるのに対し、安倍は日本の次の首相として政権を担うことが確実視されているのだから。

9月20日、安倍はほぼまちがいに自民党の新総裁に選出されるだろう。それを受けて26日には、国会の首班指名を経て首相の座に就く見通しだ。

だが、その新首相がどういうリーダーなのかは、誰もはっきりとはわかっていない。51歳の安倍は日本の歴代の首相と比べて、格段に若い。政府の要職に就いた経験はほとんどなく、(とくに経済政策で)どのような考え方の持ち主なのかははっきりしない。

安倍がめざすのは中国の覇権阻止 - しかし強硬路線に不安を感じている国民も少なくない

安倍のめざす政治について知ろうと思えば、わずかな手がかりから判断する以外にない。その数少ない判断材料からうかがえる「安倍政治」は、すでに世界の多くの人々の不安をかき立てている。

安倍には、少なくとも二つの大目標がある。一つは、憲法9条を改正すること。もう一つは、北東アジアで中国が優位に立つのを阻止することだ(憲法改正もその一手段なのかもしれない)。

いずれもリスクを伴う政策だ。しばらく前までなら、憲法改正を唱えただけで、日本の一般的な有権者からは「無責任な過激派」とみなされただろう。安倍の思い描くような対中政策を危なっかしいとみる国民は、今でも多い。

日本を取り巻く国際情勢も平穏とはいえない。北東アジアの緊張は高まっている。韓国の最近のある世論調査では、北朝鮮より日本を安全保障上の脅威と考える人のほうが多かった。一方、中国は近隣諸国に影響力を拡大し、軍備拡張を急速に進めている。北朝鮮の行動は読みにくく、核実験を準備している可能性もある。

しかも、日本の最大の同盟国であるアメリカとこの3カ国の関係も良好とはいえない。中曽根康弘元首相のように、日本も独自の兵器プログラムの立ち上げを検討すべきかもしれないと主張する論者も現れている。

### 国民に直接語りかける小泉型の手法を取得

こうした危うい国際環境のもとで、タカ派の安倍が首相に就任するのだ。「見かけは洗練されていてソフトに見えるかもしれないが」と、ソウル大学の朴喆熙（パク・チョルヒ/Park Cheol Hee）教授（日本政治）は言う。「安倍は筋金入りの保守派。（緊迫した状況を）ますます悪化させかねない」

安倍はこれまで、演説などで繰り返し憲法改正の必要性を訴えてきた。安倍が望むのは、憲法9条の文言を改めて、軍隊の保有を合法化し、軍隊の使用方法に柔軟性をもたせることだ。

安倍の取り巻きのなかには、第2次大戦中の従軍慰安婦に関する記述の削除など、歴史教科書の見直しを求めている超保守派グループの面々もいる。安倍自身も最近の著書『美しい国へ』（文春新書）で、第2次大戦の戦争指導者を裁いた極東国際軍事裁判（東京裁判）の正当性に疑問を投げかけた。「憲法改正と教育改革 - これが（安倍の）中核的な信念」と、東京大学の蒲島郁夫教授（政治学）は言う。

問題は、その目標を実現するだけの力量を安倍が持っているのかどうか。安倍は現在務めている官房長官以外に閣僚歴がなく、一つの省を切り回した経験をもたない。県知事として県政を担ったこともない。政府の役職に就いたのは、2000年の官房副長官が最初だった（ただしこれも、実際に政策を遂行するというよりは、補佐官的性格の強いポストだ）。

それでも安倍は、そのチャンスを最大限に活用した。官房副長官時代に拉致問題で北朝鮮への強硬姿勢を前面に押し出し、国民の強い支持を獲得。昨年10月からは小泉の下で官房長官を務めてきた。この経歴を通じて安倍は、密室の駆け引きに頼るのではなく、国民に直接語りかけるという小泉流の政治手法を巧みに取り入れていった。

しかし蒲島も指摘するように、今後は世論を味方につけるだけでは十分でない。政界内の抵抗も乗り越えていかななくてはならない。

憲法改正案を国民投票にかけるには、衆参両院で議員の 3 分の以上の賛成が必要だが、最大野党の民主党は対決姿勢を強めているし、連立パートナーの公明党も憲法改正には抵抗が強い。小泉は郵政民営化法案を通すために衆議院の解散に踏み切った。安倍には憲法改正に政権の命運をかける覚悟があるだろうか。

おそらく、その覚悟はないだろう。だとすれば、安倍は政権の命運をかけて、何を成し遂げるつもりなのか。新首相は、さまざまな重大問題に対処しなくてはならない。社会の少子高齢化は深刻だし、政府は巨額の財政赤字をかかえている。国の借金は、GDP（国内総生産）の 1.6 倍。この数字は、OECD（経済協力開発機構）に加盟する先進 30 カ国のなかで最も大きい。

### 抵抗勢力・派閥政治と完全に決別できるか

国の直面する課題を解決しようにも、安倍には小泉のようなカリスマ性がない。痛みを伴う改革を押し通すのはむずかしいだろう。政治アナリストの間では、対決色を弱めて小泉改革を継続すると予測する声が多い。つまり、政府の支出を削減しつつ、経済の再生から取り残された人たちへの支援も約束することになりそうだ。

本人や周辺は「重量級」指導者というイメージを確立しようと努力しているが、1993 年の衆院選で初当選した安倍は、日本の政界ではまだまだ若手。「意思決定者やマネジャーとしての実力は未知数」だと、政策研究大学院大学の飯尾潤教授は言う。「経験不足は否定できない」

今後の最大の焦点は、安倍が小泉の路線を継承して、自民党内の既得権益をたたくのかどうかだ。

実際には、その可能性は低いようにみえる。そもそも、安倍の売り物の一つは、政治家としての「毛並み」の良さだ。祖父の岸信介は、1950 年代に首相を務めた。父の安倍晋太郎は 1970～80 年代に外相などの要職を歴任。首相の座をめざしていたが、志半ばで病死した。要するに、安倍自身が政界の究極のインサイダーなのだ。

小泉改革の主眼の一つは、古い自民党型政治の打破にあった。とくに小泉は首相官邸主導の政治を実践し、派閥の影響力を弱めようとしてきた。

安倍もこの改革を引き継ぐことを望むだろう。古い派閥主導・コンセンサス重視の政治では、安倍のような若手の政治家がトップにのぼり詰めることなどできなかったはずだからだ。「(総裁選の)選挙運動は、派閥の干渉なしで進んでいる」と、安倍を支持する下村博文衆院議員は言う。「派閥の力は、今後も衰退していくだろう」

その半面、古い自民党政治を好む人たちと完全に決別したとは言いきれない。安倍は、郵政民営化に反対して自民党を離れた一部の議員ときわめて親しい関係にあるともいわれる。参議院自民党の実力者、青木幹雄・参院議員会長も最近、郵政「造反組」に復党を呼びかけるよう安倍に促している。

靖国問題でみせた意外に「策士」な一面

安倍にとって最大の課題の一つは、来年夏の参院選。この選挙で自民党が議席を減らすかもしれないというのがおおかたの見方だ。安倍としては、少しでも勢力を増やしたいはず。郵政造反組を復党させるという誘惑に勝てないかもしれない。「政権基盤強化のためにそれを行えば、改革者としてのイメージに傷がつき、国民の支持を失うだろう」と、飯尾は言う。「党内の足場固めと国民の人気獲得は両立しない」

とはいえ、小泉長期政棟を経験したばかりの日本は、差しあたって「一匹狼型」の指導者に飽き飽きしている面もあるだろう。そうした空気が安倍の言動にブレーキをかける可能性もある。

安倍は7月の北朝鮮のミサイル発射実験を受けて、将来のミサイル攻撃を阻止するために、敵基地攻撃能力の整備も検討すべき時期に来ているのではないかという趣旨の発言をし、物議をかもした。しかし後になって、主張をトーンダウンさせている。

懸案の靖国問題へのアプローチも巧妙だ。「(首相就任後に)参拝するという公約はしていない」と、衆院議員の下村は言う。つまり、自身の靖国参拝を中国や韓国に対する外交カードとして使う余地を残しているのだ。

就任早々に、アジア外交で「サプライズ」が準備されている可能性もある。中韓との首脳会談実現に向けて、安倍の側近が水面下で奔走しているという噂もある。

首相官邸の権限を強化するための具体策が打ち出されることも考えられる。米ホワイトハウスの国家安全保障会議(NSC)に相当する組織を官邸に設けたり、日本版のCIA(中央情報局)を創設したりするかもしれない。

しかし、こうした個々の政策は別にして、危機に遭遇したときに安倍がどう振る舞いを見せるかはまだ誰にもわからない。微妙な問題に対して攻撃的な態度を取りがちな安倍流のアプローチは、危機の状況では好ましくない結果を生むおそれもある。

安倍晋三というリーダーの実像を知るためには、実際に首相の座に就くまで待つしかないようだ。

## Asia's Mystery Man

Shinzo Abe, likely to be the country's next leader, has a slim track record. But he's already worrying the neighbors.

**BY Christian Caryl and Akiko Kashiwagi**

Newsweek International

Sept. 18, 2006 issue - When Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi visited the controversial Tokyo war memorial known as Yasukuni Shrine last month, the story made headlines around the world and triggered indignant protests in Seoul and Beijing. But when the news broke a few days later that Koizumi's political confidant Shinzo Abe had made his own surreptitious visit to the shrine earlier in the year, few outside Japan took notice. Even given the fact that Abe had made a point of avoiding the cameras, the reactions still seem disproportionate. The first of the two men, after all, is about to step off the political stage and into the history books. The other is almost certain to step onto it this month and become Japan's next prime minister—a job he could hold for years to come.

On Sept. 20, in all likelihood, Abe will be elected president of Japan's ruling Liberal Democratic Party—a victory that will guarantee his election, a few days later, as prime minister. His accession to the top job has looked virtually assured ever since early July, when his closest rival, Yasuo Fukuda, pulled out of the race. Fukuda had been campaigning as the dovish alternative to the tough-talking Abe. But then North Korea fired a clutch of missiles into the Sea of Japan, shifting the balance decisively in favor of the hawkish candidate, who first transformed himself into a national figure in 2002 by harshly indicting North Korea for its abductions of innocent Japanese citizens back in the 1970s.

What will the world see when the cameras are finally trained on Abe? The problem is that no one—not even the Japanese—really knows. At the tender age of 51, Abe is decades younger than most of his predecessors. He has no high-level government track record, and his policy views in some areas, especially in terms of economic reform, are vague. That's caused observers to latch onto what little they do know about his ambitions—which, despite the muted reaction to his Yasukuni visit, are worrying to many outside Japan.

He's got at least two big goals, and they're both risky. The first is revising the Constitution to eliminate Japan's pacifist postwar military tradition, and the second, which could be a function of the first, is defying China's bid for regional pre-eminence. A generation ago, the first idea would have struck mainstream Japanese voters as irresponsibly radical; the second even now strikes many as fraught with uncertainty.

The elevation of a tough-talking patriot to Japan's top leadership position comes at an uneasy time. Tensions are already rising in Northeast Asia. One recent poll showed that more South Koreans see Japan as a security threat than North Korea. Meantime, China is throwing its weight around and is engaged in a rapid military buildup. North Korea is weak and capricious, and may be preparing to conduct a nuclear test. And relations between the United States, Japan's chief ally, and all three countries are fractious. Former Japanese prime minister Yasuhiro Nakasone suggested last week that Japan might need to consider starting a weapons program of its own. It's a volatile brew, to say the least. "On the surface, Abe may look subtle and sophisticated," says professor Park Cheol Hee of Seoul National University. "But his ideas

are staunchly conservative, and he could make [tensions] worse."

In his speeches, Abe has repeatedly touched on the need to revise the 1947 Constitution. The focus would almost certainly be on Article 9, the clause that bans Japan from maintaining a military. Abe would like to see language that would legitimize the armed forces and enable more flexibility in how they're used. His entourage includes several prominent members of the archconservative movement to revise Japanese-history textbooks—which, among other things, aims to eliminate references to the wartime "comfort women" forced into sexual slavery by the Japanese military. In his best-selling book, "Toward a Beautiful Country," Abe himself casts doubt on the legitimacy of the Tokyo Tribunal, the Allied court that condemned Japanese leaders as war criminals. "Constitutional revision and education reform—those are his core beliefs," says Tokyo University law professor Ikuo Kabashima.

But can he make any of it happen? Abe has never held a ministerial position or run a regional government. To be sure, he has paid his dues as a member of the Japanese Parliament, where he has served five terms since he first joined back in 1993. But his first governmental position came in 2000, when Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori gave him a job as a deputy cabinet secretary, a staff position that involves little real policymaking.

He made the best of it. His popularity surged in 2002 when he harshly criticized North Korea for its abductions of Japanese citizens. From there he went on to a two-year stint as the secretary-general of the LDP. But it was only in October 2005 that he got his first truly senior position in the government, when Koizumi appointed him to the chief-cabinet-secretary post he holds today. Abe has deftly used the platform to embrace the new style of politics pioneered by his patron—appealing directly to the Japanese electorate rather than relying on the back-room maneuverings of the LDP.

As Kabashima points out, Abe will have to do more than court public opinion. He'll also have to surmount the objections of fellow pols. Revising the Constitution will require a two-thirds majority in Parliament—meaning that Abe will have to overcome resistance from the increasingly assertive opposition party, the Democratic Party of Japan, as well as the LDP's own coalition partner, the New Komeito Party, which tends to oppose constitutional revision. Experts wonder if Abe would be willing to stake his legitimacy, and that of his government, on the passage of constitutional reform, as Koizumi did over privatizing the postal service by calling a snap election.

Perhaps not. But that raises an even more important question—what *would* Abe stake his political future on? The new prime minister will face some massive challenges, some bequeathed to him by his predecessor. They include Japan's headlong demographic decline and its bankrupt government (total debt now equals 160 percent of GDP—the highest of 30 countries in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development). Abe, while popular, doesn't have the charisma that allowed Koizumi to sell tough measures to a skeptical public. Analysts predict that he'll thus pursue a less confrontational version of Koizumi's reform plan, trimming some government expenditures while promising to help out those left behind by the recovery.

Although Abe has been assiduously cultivating an image of gravitas—his camp has issued a flurry of manifestos, position papers and catchily titled program proposals—the reality is that he's something of a novice. The point is not lost on members of Japan's political class. They're already angling to impose their own agendas on the newcomer, who, perhaps for that reason, finds himself compelled to repeat the mantra that he's entirely his own man. "He is an unknown quantity as a decision maker and manager," says Jun Iio, professor at the National

Graduate Institute for Policy Studies. "There is no denying his lack of experience."

The biggest question of all will be whether Abe has the nerve to continue the assault on his party's vested interests begun by Koizumi. It seems unlikely. After all, one of Abe's selling points has always been that he's the ultimate insider—with a background, and a corresponding sense of entitlement, that makes George W. Bush look downright plebeian. Abe's grandfather, Nobusuke Kishi, served in the upper ranks of wartime government. After the war he was at first arrested as a war criminal by the Allies; then, after his release from prison, he went on to become the postwar prime minister responsible for forging the U.S.-Japanese alliance. Shintaro Abe, Shinzo's father, was a foreign minister in the golden 1980s whose own bid for the top job was cut short by cancer. Abe's pride in this illustrious pedigree is palpable.

It's one advantage that could well prove a liability. One of Koizumi's targets during his reform campaign was the LDP factions that doled out lucrative public-works contracts and political favors under the tutelage of all-powerful barons. By undermining the factions, Koizumi empowered the prime minister's office, giving him greater flexibility to implement policy as he saw fit. It's a trend that Abe would apparently like to continue; after all, under the consensus-driven faction system, a youngster like him would have never had a chance at the party's top post. "The campaign has been run without the interference of the factions," insists Abe supporter Hakubun Shimomura. "The faction system will only continue to decline."

Still, some members of Abe's camp are offering olive branches to those in the party who prefer the old way of doing things. The daily newspaper Asahi Shimbun quoted one unnamed pro-Abe parliamentarian who praised Abe for his "kindness." According to the legislator, "Abe would not cut people off." That was a reference to Koizumi's notoriously rough treatment of conservative dissidents within the LDP. Abe is said to be personally close to some LDP exiles—and Mikio Aoki, an LDP grandee in the upper house of Parliament, recently urged Abe to invite them back into the LDP fold. One of the biggest problems for Abe is that his party has an election coming up next year (for the upper house), and the consensus is that the LDP could lose seats—meaning that Abe may need every ally he can get. The temptation to make peace with the exiles may prove too strong to resist. "If he does that to bolster his administration, it would hurt his image as a reformer and cost him public support," says Iio. "Consolidating the party and courting public support are mutually contradictory."

Then again, maybe Japan has had enough of mavericks for the time being. That could temper Abe's more impulsive instincts, too. This summer he shocked many of his compatriots when he responded to the North Korean missile tests by suggesting that it might be time to consider the option of pre-emptive strikes to prevent future launches. But Abe subsequently backtracked, and lately he's adopted a softer tone. His policy on the thorny Yasukuni issue is shrewd. Abe supporter Shimomura notes that "he has not made a pledge to go" as prime minister, giving him an opening to visit the shrine in the future as a diplomatic trump card in negotiations with Beijing and Seoul.

Surprises could be in the offing. Rumor has it, for example, that Abe's aides are busily working behind the scenes to set up summit meetings with the leaders of China and South Korea, in a bid for a fresh diplomatic start with those neighbors. He could also move swiftly to continue Koizumi's practice of expanding the powers of the cabinet office, perhaps by creating a new U.S.-style National Security Council or possibly even a new central intelligence organization. Some of this should be relatively easy to do. But no one knows how a Prime Minister Abe would handle himself in a crisis, when his hard-charging approach to sensitive issues could prove counterproductive. If you want to get to know Shinzo Abe, wait until the

real work begins.

*With B. J. Lee in Seoul*

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